DANGEROUS COMPANIONS:

COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES AND NONSTATE ARMED GROUPS (NAGs)

A Triadic Level Time-Series Dataset on Support of NAGs by States

CODEBOOK
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I. INTRODUCTION

Dangerous Companions is a project trying to realize two objectives with respect to the interactions between states and Non-State Armed Groups (NAGs, hereon). Building on a novel conceptualization of state and armed rebel groups relations, it engages in (1) collecting data on these relations and (2) building a continuously maintained data portal, which is accessible by public and includes information on individual profiles of NAGs and states they are allied with. *Dangerous Companions* Project (DCP) builds on the understanding that NAGs are not mere agents of states, simply serving to realize the objectives of states they subject themselves to. Obviously, when trying to provide support to an armed opposition group, a state goes through a decision-making process since it is a risky experiment to begin with. Nonetheless, states have historically used these alternative actors of international politics to pursue certain foreign policy goals, regardless of whether it proved to be a successful strategy or not. Yet, similar to states, the leaders and members of NAGs go through a decision-making process as well in deciding whether to receive external support from other states and which states provide the most effective grounds for extracting human and material recourses to support the operations of these groups. In other words, the current conceptualization of state-NAGs relations goes beyond a simple treatment of these actors as a part of proxy wars conducted by major states in world politics. When it comes to motives of actors, states and NAGs, the theoretical framework is further developed in *States in Disguise* (San-Akca 2016) to capture the varieties of state-NAGs relations.

Each of these decision-making processes are referred as State Selection and Rebel Selection, respectively with the understanding that states might select the NAGs to provide support to, but it does not tell us the entire story about the ways NAGs select and extract resources from external states. For examples, Hamas received support from several countries, such as Jordan, Syria and Iraq, which provided safe haven to the leaders and/or members of Hamas occasionally since 1993. On the other hand, Hamas had supporters in United States and United Kingdom, who managed to raise funds for the organization and transfer these funds to Hamas. These are two distinct processes referred by the framework developed under the current project. In the former, states are intentionally choosing to support Hamas. In the latter, states do not create channels with the goal of supporting the organization, but rather gets exploited due to the individual freedom and liberties intrinsically found in democracies. Though in either case, Hamas achieve acquiring resources, they are not necessarily the same, thus should be treated and coded separately.

NAGs refer to any armed opposition group that uses violent means to pursue certain political objectives. It is an overarching concept used to refer to ethnic and religious insurgents, revolutionary movements and terrorists. Insurgency, terrorism and revolution are various forms of violence NAGs resort to in realizing their objectives. Therefore, it is not useful for the purposes of the current project to refer to these groups with politically loaded concepts, such as revolutionaries or terrorists. It is commonly accepted now that NAGs acquire resources through various channels, such as Diaspora Support, charity organizations engaging in fund raising, smuggling of drugs and weapons, and engaging in illicit trade among the many others. The purpose of the current project is to examine the general patterns about the nature of states that NAGs most frequently conduct such activities to acquire these resources. Therefore, the current project stands in direct challenge to the post-9/11 assumption that the major problem behind terrorism and armed rebels in general, is ungoverned territories or weak states. Designated borders between states divide majority of

the world's territory. So, it must be the case that more than 90% of the time, armed groups are operating within the borders of states, which claim monopoly of the legitimate use of violent means. *What kind of domestic and international environment attracts armed groups to certain states when it comes to acquiring resources within their territories?*

The State-NAGs Cooperation Dataset (NAGs Dataset) collected for the current project is an attempt to operationalize external state support of Non-State Armed Groups (NAGs, hereon) that are engaged in a violent conflict against one or more governments within or outside the state(s) they live. The groups and the states they target are borrowed from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (v 4-2014a) (Gleditsch, Wallensteen et al. 2002, Pettersson & Wallensteen 2015).   In total, there is information about 455 NAGs that have existed in the post-1945 period. The first version of the dataset (v.4/2015) covers the period between 1945 and 2010. Each case in the dataset is a triad that involves a NAG, a target – the country subject to the violence of the NAG-, and a supporter –the country that has provided one or more types of support, such as training camps, safe havens, arms and equipment, funds, and troops to the NAG. Detailed description of each variable is given in the table below. Next, case selection, each variable and corresponding coding rule have been explained in detail. A triad is listed for the entire period of a NAG's activity if a state ends up supporting it for at least one year during the period it is active.

The other contribution of the current project is the public data portal site with information on each rebel group and states they allied with. Given that it is a challenging task to find and code information about state support, whether it is an intentional act on the part of a state or a case of rebels selecting them to extract resources from, the best one could do is to transparently share the sources and material used to collect and code such information. DCP data portal presents profiles of each NAG listing thousand of sources used to gather the required information. In addition, it provides data visualization by using maps and profiles for each group.

1.1. How is the NAGs Dataset placed next to other existing datasets on the issue of external state support?

There are several other existing datasets on non-state actors and third-party interventions. Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan's Non-State Actor (NSA) (2009), is a dyadic dataset with information on each NSA's military strength and capacity, leadership characteristic, popular support and political linkages as well as external sponsorship. However, external state support is not broken into diverse types. We only know if there was explicit or implicit support by external states. Similarly, UCDP's External Support Data is another dyadic dataset which also codes external supporters that give support to a NAG in a given year from 1975 to 2010, also coding for different types of support and the type of the external supporter (Hogbladh et al. 2011). This data is limited in its temporal domain, which does not go beyond 1975. The total number of observations in the external support dataset is around 7900, whereas the total number of observations in the NAGs Dataset is around 17250. Furthermore, in either of these datasets, there is not information on the ideational characteristics of NAGs, such as ethnic and religious identity and political ideology they adhere to. Finally Regan and Aydin's data on external interventions into civil conflicts looks particularly at diplomatic third party interventions (2006). This dataset takes intrastate conflicts as one single unit and does not distinguish between different parties and non-state actors that are included in an intrastate conflict (Regan, Frank, Aydın 2009).

1.2. What is new about the DCP and NAGs Dataset?

NAGs Dataset differentiates between state and NAGs selection cases. Though it might be misleading to refer to interactions emerging at the end of both processes as state support or cooperation, to some extent it is justified since states turn out to be *de facto* supporters of rebels in the end of the rebel selection process. Since we do not have a way of understanding the intentions of each state leader and bureaucrat about whether they really want to support or curb support for NAGs, if they found themselves selected by them, the healthiest way to go about coding such information is relying on observed realities. Even in the case of NAGs selection, states turn into facilitators of violent operations of NAGs despite their will to do so. Therefore, it is not indeed wrong to refer to both cases as state support, emerging either by a state's intended and unintended acts. Secondly, NAGs Dataset starts coding a NAG as soon as it declares a name regardless of whether it conducts violent operations to begin with, while the ACD takes the start of a NAG as the year in which at least one battle-related death occurs for the first time. This is despite the fact that sometimes NAGs might have existed long before they resort to violence. Another contribution of the current project is the detailed coding of group objectives and ideational characteristics.

Previously, Byman (2005b) took the initiative in classifying several paths armed opposition movements, specifically terrorists, end up acquiring resources from states. He refers to passive support of rebels by states under three conditions: "(1) the regime in question itself does not provide assistance but knowingly allows other actors in the country to aid a terrorist group, (2) the regime has the capacity to stop this assistance or has chosen not to develop this capacity, and (3) often passive support is given by political parties, wealthy merchants, or other actors in society that have no formal affiliation with the government" (Byman 2005b, 118). Except the last criterion, the first two are very difficult to determine in each case even if one puts enough time and resources to do so. It is very difficult to figure out whether "a government chooses not to develop capacity" to curb support of rebels within its territories. And, it is very difficult to know whether a regime or government "knowingly allows other actors in the country to aid" rebel groups.

Though appreciating the way to conceptualize passive support of terrorism, the ambituous data collection and coding project specified under DCP requires developing a standardized set of criteria that will make coding a large number of cases possible. Such criteria can be developed if we rely on what is observed rather than what is intended. Since the intentions do not always lead to observable outcomes. Rather than treating capacity as a selection criterion when coding cases, it is better to treat it as a variable. This way, it will be possible to detect whether NAGs or armed rebels select states with weak or low capacity to control their activities within the former's borders. Each variable is defined and explained in the following sections.

2. List of variables

Variable Short Name	Variable Long Name & Measurement
TriadID	Triad identifier – Unique Triad Id Number for a given NAG, its target and supporter
DyadID	Dyad identifier – UCDP / PRIO Dyad Code
ConflictID	Conflict identifier – UCDP PRIO Conflict ID

Startdate1	the year in which at least one Battle-Related Death is observed in UCDP/PRIO
Startdate2	the year in which at least 25 BRDs are observed in UCDP/PRIO
Target	Target country name- abbreviation
TarNum_COW	Numeric COW ID of target country
NAG_name	Full Name of the NAG
NAGcode_1	Numeric code of the non-state armed group
NAGcode_2	Numeric UCDP/PRIO code of the NAG
Incomp	Incompatibility – UCDP/PRIO
Terr	Name of territory
Foundyr	Foundation year
Year	Year of observation
NAGID 1-5	Identity of NAG (Numeric): 1- NOID, 2- Ethno-nationalist, 3- religious, 4- leftist, 5- other
NAGEth	Ethnic identity of the NAG (Name)
NAGRel	Religion the non-state actor belongs to (Name)
NAGLeft	Whether the NAG is a leftist revolutionary group (Binary)
NAGRight	Whether the NAG is a right-wing group (Binary) – fascist or conservative or other (specify)
NAGDem	Whether the NAG has democratic aspirations (Binary)
NAGAuth	Whether NAG aspires to establish an authoritarian regime
NAGDict	Whether NAG is supporting a dictatorial regime
NAGMil	Whether NAG is supporting a military regime
NAGTheo	Whether NAG aspires to establish a theocratic regime
NAGObj 1-6	Objective of the NAG (Numerical): 1- toppling an existing leadership, 2- change of regime type (transition from autocracy to democracy or the reverse regime change), 3- demands for autonomy, 4- secession/territorial demand, 5- demands for policy change, 6- Other – specify Each category is coded as separate binary variables. A group may have more than a single objective.
PolParDummy	Political party dummy – whether the group has a party wing
PolParDummy	Political party dummy – whether the group has a party wing
StateSupporter	Country providing support to a NAG – Abbreviation
SupNum_COW	COW country code of the supporter

S_Precision 1-10 (coded separately for each support type)	Support precision 1- supporter state clear intention 2- reliable sources document support 3-support is highly suspected by reliable source 4- target state accuses supporter state without documentation.
S_SafeMem	Safe haven to members
S_SafeLead	Safe haven to leadership
S_Offices	Headquarters – if a group has an office in a country for propaganda purposes
S_TrainCamp	Training camp
S_Training	Training
S_WeaponLog	Weapons and logistics aid
S_FinAid	Financial aid
S_Transport	Transport of the military equipment, military advice
S_Troop	Troops
S_Other	Any other kind of intentional support
DS_Precision 1-9	De facto support precision 1- supporter state clear intention 2- reliable sources document support 3-support is highly suspected by reliable source 4- target state accuses supporter state without documentation.
DS_SafeMem	Safe haven to members
DS_SafeLead	Safe haven to leadership
DS_Offices	Headquarters – if a group has an office in a country for propaganda purposes
DS_TrainCamp	Training camp
DS_Training	Training
DS_WeaponLog	Weapons and logistics aid
DS_FinAid	Financial aid
DS_Transport	Transport of the military equipment, military advice
DS_Other	Any other kind of support
DomSup	Domestic support dummy – whether there was civilian support in terms of protests within target state in a given year
DomSup_P	1 – not much confident, 2- somehow confident, 3- confident
SupTermDummy	Support termination dummy
TargetPressure	Target country pressure
IntlComPressure	International community pressure
RegChTar	Regime change in the target country
RegChSup	Regime change in the supporting country
LeadChangeSup	Leadership change in the supporting country
GroupCeaseAct	Group ceased activity
GroupCeasefire	Group signed a ceasefire
GroupPol	Group turned into a political movement
Other_term	Other termination – explain

3. CASES

Identifying the Targets

In order to identify the states that have been targets of non-state violence in the post-WWII period, I rely on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2011, 1946-2010 (Gleditssch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2011).

Identifying the Groups

The groups included in the data set have to meet the criterion of "25-battle related deaths" according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD). I use the same groups as in UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2014a, 1946-2014 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen et al. 2002, Pettersson & Wallensteen 2015). The ACD identifies an opposition organization as following: "Any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed force to influence the outcome of the stated incompatibility". Two types of incompatibility are identified by the Armed Conflict Dataset: 1- "incompatibility concerning government: type of political system, the replacement of the central government, or the change of its composition"; 2- "Incompatibility concerning territory: Incompatibility concerning the status of a territory, e.g. the change of the state in control of a certain territory (interstate conflict), secession or autonomy (internal conflict)" (Gleditsch, Wallensteen et al. 2002, Pettersson & Wallensteen 2015). As is described below, the NAGs Dataset has a further detailed coding of group objectives.

Identifying the Period

The temporal domain in the data set is identified as the "opportunity period"; the period during which a state has the opportunity to support a group. This basically stems from the fact that a group has to be active in order for a state to have an opportunity to support a group. Therefore, the year variable specifies the years during which a group is active. In some cases, a group ceases activity for a while and then restarts its violence. As long as the group and the government it targets do not sign a settlement treaty and the dispute is not entirely resolved, these brief spells of ceasefire are treated as activity years. In other words, once a group resorts to violence, it is considered as actively targeting a state, thus the opportunity to support the group continues existing, unless there is a settlement or group ceases violence and converts into a political party. Concerning the information about conflict termination, this data set draws upon the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset (v.2010-1) (Kreutz 2010). The UCDP Conflict Termination dataset identifies 7 types of termination: Peace agreement, ceasefire agreement with conflict regulation, ceasefire agreement, victory, low activity, other, and joining alliance. As long as the conflict does not end with the first 4 types of outcome, the current data set does not consider a NAG terminated and codes external support until the group ceases.

UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset codes two different start years for a group. The first year (Startdate1) is coded when there is at least one battle-related death in a conflict. And a second start date (startdate2) is coded when there are at least twenty-five battle-related deaths in a conflict. The second start date is considered as the onset of a conflict within a given government-opposition group conflict. And, there might be multiple conflicts within a given government-opposition organization conflict. The current data codes the first year when a group is formed as the beginning of the activity period regardless violence is

observed or not. This way, it is also possible to observe whether receiving external support prompts groups to resort to violence. Of course, this is attainable when the formation year is before the first year in which a minimum of one battle-related death is observed.

4. DEFINITION OF VARIABLES:

TriadID: Each row in the dataset represents a triad-year. A triad consists of a target, a supporter, and a NAG that resorts to violent means against a country (target) to achieve its political objectives. This number is constituted in the following way: target COW ID*1,000,000+NAGcode*1,000+potential supporter COWID. For example, in calculating the triadID number for Algeria (target), Armed Islamic Group (NAG), and France (supporter);

> COW ID for Algeria: 615
> NAGcode for the Armed Islamic Group: 2
> COWID for France: 220
>
> **Triadid = [(615*1000000) + (2*1000) + 220] = 615002220**

DyadID: A unique identifier generated by UCD/ PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Dyadic Codebook to identify each dyad of rebel group and its target state (Gleditsch, Wallensteen et al. 2002, Pettersson & Wallensteen 2015).

ConflictID: Conflict identifier from the UCDP/PRIO dataset.

Startdate1: Adopted directly from UCDP/PRIO dataset

Startdate2: Adopted from UCDP/PRIO dataset

Target: The country facing a threat from a NAG.

TarNum_COW: COW country code for target.

NAG_name: Full name of the group.

NAGcode_1: The numeric code of the NAG (ranges from 1 to 455). In the end, a list of groups, their codes in the dataset and the period of activity are listed. As long as the group did not sign an agreement with the government, we do not consider it terminated.

NAGcode_2: Numeric UCDP/PRIO code of the NAG

Incomp: Incompatibility as coded by UCDP/PRIO ACD

Terr: Name of territory under dispute (from UCDP/PRIO)

Foundyr: The UCDP/PRIO dataset starts coding a group after at least 1 Battle-related death is observed. However, some groups existed long before a battle related death occurred. Therefore, this variable is coded separately.

Year: The year of observation. Each triad is listed for the period during which a NAG is active beginning from its formation year regardless there is violence in that year or not.

NAGID: Identity of the NAG (Numeric):

        1- NOID
        2- Ethno-nationalist
        3- Religious
        4- Leftist
        5- Other (specify)

These categories are not mutually exclusive. In many cases, it is possible to associate a NAG with multiple identities. The groups, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas can be identified both as an ethnic and a religious-oriented group. The ideational identity of these groups has been recorded for both variables of ethnic and religious identity. If a group does not associate itself with any identity and/or ideology, such as the Cocoyes in Congo, then it is coded as not having any ideational identity. Although the group has aspirations to change the leadership, it does not make propaganda for a specific ethnic or religious group and/or political ideology. Rather, it aspires to be inclusive by bringing together multiple ethnic groups in Southern Congo.

Determining the ethnic, religious, or ideological aspirations of each group requires extensive analysis of the components of the ideational spectrum they identify themselves with. For example, Moro National Liberation Front (in contrast to Moro Islamic Liberation Front) does not aspire to found an Islamic state in Southern Philippines. Rather, it wants autonomy for areas populated by Moro Muslims. This group is coded as an ethno-nationalist group. Although Islam is a part of their identity, it is not the main driving force. In cases, there are multiple identities, the overwhelmingly emphasized one is coded besides recording each components of a group's identity under the corresponding variables below. In order to attract international attention and support from major powers such as Soviet Union, China or the USA, some NAGs have claimed to follow a "communist" or as "democratic" ideology despite the fact that their actions clearly did not conform to either one of them. For example, the National Liberation Front in Algeria has been labeled with different ideologies over the course of its history; anti-colonial, nationalist and communist movement. In such cases, their discourse has been disregarded and their actions have been taken as a basis for coding.

NAGeth: the ethnic identity of the group. Ethnic identity is not only coded for ethno-nationalist movements, but for all movements. The Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (EPR) was used to code the ethnic identity of each group (Cederman et al. 2010). Lars-Erik Cederman; Brian Min; Andreas Wimmer's EPR dataset is hosted by the GROWup portal (http://growup.ethz.ch/) which matches each UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict data NAGs with corresponding ethnic groups in each target state. (Girardin et al. 2015) However; at the time of the coding of NAG dataset, ethnic identities of groups were not yet available. Therefore, each NAG's ethnic identity was coded according to EPR identities by the Dangerous Companions Project team. In cases where a group's ethnic identity was not clear, the identity of the group's leader was coded instead. For multiethnic NAGs whose composition included members with more than three different ethnic backgrounds, only the top three ethnicities found in their country of origin have been included.

NAGrel: the religious identity of the group. It does not necessarily mean that the group wants a religious regime or identifies itself openly with a religious affiliation. For example,

PKK never uses religion as part of its identity, yet it is coded in accordance with the religious identity group members overwhelmingly belong to. The religion categories are coded according to the indicators of the World Religion Project (Maoz and Henderson 2013). If we can find the specific branch of a religion that the group identifies itself with (e.g. Sunni, Shia, Catholic, Orthodox etc.), we use such labels in coding. Otherwise, this variable is coded as broad religious identities (e.g. Muslim, Christian). The categories coded for religion can be found in the list below. Similar to the NAGeth variable, for multireligious NAGs whose composition included members with more than three different religious backgrounds, only the top three ethnicities found in their country of origin have been included.

Table 1. World Religion Project Religion Categories coded for NAGs

Variable Label	Variable
chrstprot	Christianity—Protestants—No. of Adherents
chrstcat	Christianity—Roman Catholics—No. of Adherents
chrstorth	Christianity—Eastern Orthodox—No. of Adherents
chrstang	Christianity—Anglican—No. of Adherents
chrstothr	Christianity—Others—No. of Adherents
chrstgen	Christianity—Total No. of Adherents
judorth	Judaism—Orthodox—No. of Adherents
jdcons	Judaism—Conservatives—No. of Adherents
judref	Judaism—Reform—No. of Adherents
judothr	Judaism--Others—No. of Adherents
judgen	Judaism—Total No. of Adherents
islmsun	Islam—Sunni—No. of Adherents
islmshi	Islam—Shi'a—No. of Adherents
islmibd	Islam--Ibadhi—No. of Adherents
islmnat	Islam—Nation of Islam—No. of Adherents
islmalw	Islam—Alawite—No. of Adherents
islmahm	Islam—Ahmadiyya—No. of Adherents
islmothr	Islam--Other—No. of Adherents
islmgen	Islam—Total No. of Adherents
budmah	Buddhism—Mahayana—No. of Adherents
budthr	Buddhism—Theravada—No. of Adherents
budothr	Buddhism--Other—No. of Adherents
budgen	Buddhism—Total No. of Adherents
zorogen	Zoroastrian—Total No. of Adherents
hindgen	Hindu—Total No. of Adherents
sikhgen	Sikh—Total No. of Adherents
shntgen	Shinto—Total No. of Adherents
bahgen	Baha'i—Total No. of Adherents
taogen	Taoism—Total No. of Adherents
jaingen	Confucianism—Total No. of Adherents
confgen	Jain—Total No. of Adherents
syncgen	Syncretic Religions- Total No. of Adherents
anmgen	Animist Religions—Total No. of Adherents

nonrelig	Non. Religious—Total No. of Adherents
othrgen	Other Religions—Total No. of Adherents

NAGleft: a dummy variable for whether a NAG is a leftist revolutionary group or not.

NAGright: if the NAG has fascist or conservative or other aspirations that we may relate to right-wing views. Ethno-nationalist NAGs with separatist aspirations have also been coded as having a right-wing ideology.

NAGdemoc: if a group claims that it has democratic aspirations, this variable is coded as "1", and "0" otherwise. There is the problem that any group may argue that it will bring democracy.

Usually any ethnic group that has aspirations for secessionism or control over government as their goals makes demands about further advancement of individual political rights and liberties. Indeed, such groups are usually ethnic minorities, such as Basque people who live in Spain or Kurdish people who live in Turkey. They emerge seeking further rights for minorities, which usually are granted if democracy level in a country increases. When we code this variable, we do not take into consideration such demands. Both PKK and ETA are not primarily looking for bringing democracy to the country they live in. Rather, they have other aspirations for their own ethnic communities.

Examples of groups that try brining democracy to a country include groups such as All Burma Students' Democratic Front. The primary motivation of ABSDF has been overthrowing the military regime in Burma and establishing a democratic rule.

NAGauth: If a group is fighting for a form of autocratic regime other than theocracy, dictatorship and military regimes, this variable is coded 1, 0 otherwise.

NAGdict: If a group is fighting for a dictatorial regime, this variable is coded as 1, otherwise 0.

NAGmil: If a group is fighting for a military regime, this variable is coded as 1, 0 otherwise. Most NAGs which carried out *coup d'états* fall under this category.

NAGtheo: If a group is fighting for a form of theocracy, this variable is coded 1, 0 otherwise. Most fundamentalist Islamist groups fall under this category.

NAGobj: the goals pursued by a NAG might be various and can change over time. UCDP PRIO Dataset codes the demands about government change and autonomy as forms of incompatibility over government and territory respectively. The objective of the group is recoded in a more detailed manner. A demand about the change of leadership is different than demand about change of regime type. By the same token PRIO data takes the stated incompatibility in the beginning of the conflict as if it continues until the end. It is known that various groups change their objective throughout the conflict duration and this in itself is a very important variable that needs to be captured.

      1- toppling an existing leadership
      2- change of regime type (transition from autocracy to democracy or the reverse regime change)

3- demands for autonomy
4- secession/territorial demand
5- demands for policy change
6- Other - specify

PolParDummy: a binary variable indicating whether there is a political party affiliated with the group in a given year. Affiliation is described as whether the party shares similar aspirations as the group and there is evidence that the party leaders communicate with militants.

PartyName: name of the political party affiliated with a NAG

Supporter: The state that supports the NAG in a given year.

SupNum_COW: The COW country code of the supporter.

State vs. De Facto Support:

Support is an action that implies an intentional act on the part of an external actor. The post-9/11 debate about terrorism focused on weak states and how they turned into safe havens for various terrorist organizations. Yet, the event of weak states turning into safe havens for terrorists or other non-state armed groups does not qualify for "support of non-state violence." State capacity should not be used as a coding criterion when deciding whether a form of support is provided or not. It should be treated as an independent variable to explain the influence of government's capacity to control their borders on whether they end up as safe havens or sources of other forms of support for NAGs. As previously argued, the best way to code whether a NAG is able to acquire resources from other states is to focus on the observable outcomes rather than intentions since the latter is pretty hard to figure out. Therefore, the current coding protocol treats cases where there is clear evidence for states creating channels to abet certain groups and this evidence is confirmed by multiple reliable sources as incidents where states select the NAGs to provide support to. On the other hand, when there is not such evidence of state support and a rebel group is able to operate within the borders of a state, it is treated as an incident of NAGs selection or *de facto support.* Then, two criteria have been relied to code state support of NAGs:

(1) Whether there was an observable indication that a given NAG was operating within the borders of other states; i.e. leaders finding safe havens. Fund raising, weapon smuggling etc.
(2) If the government or leadership in a given state was knowingly creating channels to a NAG in question. For example, Egypt was knowingly letting Fedayeen to operate within its borders till the Suez Crisis, after which they extradited them from their territories.
(3) In the absence of confirmable information that the government or leadership in a given state was providing support to rebels or creating channels to facilitate their activities, it is assumed to be *de facto* support, i.e. NAGs selecting the states from which to acquire resources to sustain their operations against their targets.

The following set of sources used in confirming state support and de facto support incidents:

(1) News wires and press releases from credible sources, such as Agence France-Presse (AFP), the United Press International (UPI), Xinhua New Agency, Reuters, Aljazeera, CNN, BBC Monitoring etc.

(2) Major newspapers, such as New York Times, the Washington Post, Independent, Guardian, Financial Times, The Globe and Mail etc.

(3) Scholarly research articles, books, book chapters and research notes published in academic and indexed journals.

In coding state selection cases, **the emphasis was on whether a government directly provides assistance to facilitate violent conducts of a NAG.** In other words, when making decision about coding a case of support, some evidence was required with respect to the government or a political actor or organization that are formally affiliated with the government providing support. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) targeted Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2001. It received intentional and direct support from Liberia, Burkina Faso and Libya in the form of safe haven for members and leaders, funds, arms, logistics and troops. In coding state support for RUF, the following is an exemplary statement we adopted from a news source:

"Nine years ago, the state's collapse, the poverty of its people and the eternal tussle for Sierra Leone's diamonds led to war. A cashiered army corporal named Foday Sankoh joined his vague notions of revolution with money and guns from Libya and Liberian warlord--now president--Charles Taylor to form the Revolutionary United Front. The RUF seized diamond fields, smuggled gemstones and became one of Africa's most thuggish militias" (Rupert 2000).

"In 1991, while still fighting in Liberia, Taylor helped launch the civil war in Sierra Leone by providing troops, training and supplies to Foday Sankoh, leader of the Revolutionary United Front. Richie was assigned to Sankoh's forces for their first incursion into Sierra Leone and has been fighting here ever since" (Douglas 2001).

Another task when coding support is determining the time and duration of support. In some cases, it is easy to find out from the sources used for collecting data on a particular NAG. Yet, sometimes it proves challenging to code the time and duration of support. When an external support is mentioned in the sources but the period of support is not clear, the release date of the sources is used as an approximate date of support. All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) was an ethno-nationalist group fighting Indian state between 1992 and 2010 for an independent state for Tripuri people. The sources dated mostly in 2002, 2008 and 2010 pointed out that ATTF recived support from Bangladesh and Pakistan. Thus, the support is coded as continuing from 2002 to 2010.

Furthermore, for each type of support coded, a precision level is determined. For the ATTF and Indian conflict, the above stated sources based the news on the accusations or allegations of the Indian government. Therefore, when coding, the lowest precision level was assigned to this particular group. Another example is Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), which fought against the Sandinista regime between 1981 and 1990. Between 1981 and 1984, the support to FDN went with the approval of the US Congress (Cody 1984, Woodward 1984). Once the Congress stopped overt support channels from the US government to FDN, Reagan went covert about supporting the FDN, which resulted in the

notorious and scandalous Iran-Contra Affair. It is a clear case of state support with a very high precision level. Indeed, the congressional reports indicate clearly that there was support during the specified period.

Precision (S_Precision & DS_Precision): In order to specify how confident the coder is that there is evidence of active support, the variable receives the following rating:

> 1 – The supporter outright stated its intention and/or type of support, and/or the support was officially documented by that state or another.
> 2 – A reliable journalist, scholar, or media outlet recorded the support and provides convincing evidence and there are other sources that confirm this information.
> 3 – Support is highly suspected by a reliable source (such as journalist, scholar, or media outlet), but cannot be confirmed by other sources.
> 4- One state accuses another state of supporting a group, but it cannot provide official documentation beyond allegations.

SUPPORT TYPES: State Selection Cases are denoted by "S" and NAGs Selection Cases are denoted by "DS" (De facto support)

For each rebel group, a table of direct citations including stories and news from reliable sources has been created by using Lexis-Nexis academic web program, Keesing's Archives, and published secondary sources, including political science journals, journals focusing on particular regions of the world, books and book chapters. Each coder received training and was given a sample NAG to code to. After inter-coder reliability is confirmed in the end of the sample group coding, they were assigned groups on a weekly basis. Regular meetings were held with the coders in order to respond to questions and concerns. In Lexis-Nexis Academic, a keyword search was done for each group for all available dates. Each coder was given a questionnaire, which is available in the end of this codebook, with directions and guidance about how to conduct research on online databases and sources to find and collect the required data. In order to determine the supporters and the type of support provided, the following keywords have been searched in the Lexis-Nexis categories "Major U.S. and World Publications," "News Wire Services," and "TV and Radio Broadcast Transcripts" with each group's name: support, assistance, sponsor, safe haven, sanctuary, training camps, camps arms, weapons, funds, troops.

Coding Rules for State Support

After a preliminary analysis and coding of 20% of the entire rebel groups and their supporters, the following rules are specified with respect to some ambiguous forms of support referred in the sources used for data coding:

1. If a state provides health services to a group's members or leaders, it qualifies as providing safe haven for members or leaders.
2. In some instances, states become hosts to negotiations and meetings between a group's leaders and the target government. This does not qualify as a form of support.
3. Some states host the headquarters of rebel groups. These headquarters organize propaganda and fundraising activities of a group and provide communication with the militants at home. This is coded as a form of support under the name of headquarters or opening offices.
4. Some states host TV channels and radio stations operated by rebels and used to disseminate information about the group. This does not qualify as a form of support

for the purposes of this project but can be the subject matter of another research project.

5. A state may provide one or more of the specified support types.
6. Some specific cases proved to be particularly complex. One such case was Palestinian militant groups finding safe havens in Lebanon. Lebanon was under the occupation of Syria and Israel between 1979 and 2005 and between 1982 and 2000, respectively. Prior to the initiation of civil war and Syrian occupation, Lebanon turned into a host for several Palestinian militant groups as well as Palestinian refugees mostly populating the South of the country. It is not clear how much Lebanese government could have resisted against the pressures of strong Arab states, such as Egypt and Syria, yet Cairo agreement turned it into a safe havens for several groups. Initially, it is coded as a state support case. Yet, later after foreign occupation, no support was coded for Lebanon and several groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, PFLP, and Fatah. Furthermore, Hezbollah emerged within Southers Lebanon as a response against the Israeli occupation. So, it was not necessarily a choice by Hezbollah to reside within Southern Lebanon. In other words, it was not like they could have emerged in Jordan or Egypt. Yet if Hezbollah sought support from external states, such as Iran and Syria, then it is coded as a clear case of state support by Iran and Syria.
7. In some cases, NAGs establish presence in a foreign country with the assistance of another rebel group targeting that foreign country. Maoist Communist Center of India (MCC)had safe havens and training camps in Nepal. Nepalese government was not involved in this assistance; Maoist insurgents fighting against Nepal helped MCC to establish facilities inside Nepal. This is a selection on the part of MCC, thus coded as *de facto* support from Nepal to MCC against India.

SafeMem: Providing safe havens to members. A certain number of militants are present within the territories of a state or they establish some bases. Safe havens are defined as "geographical spaces where non-state armed groups members are able to establish organizational and operational base that allows them to engage in financing activities, developing a communications network for command and control, achieving access to weapons and developing logistics network to enable travel, the movement of money and weapons (Kittner 2007, p.308). Geographical spaces in which militants acquire operational space for training are coded separately as "training camps". This does not annul the fact that training camps are also operational spaces. Mere refugee camps do not qualify as safe havens. There needs to be some proof that militants infiltrated into these camps and operate from these places.

Providing safe havens to members of a rebel group is different than providing training camps or access to existing camps. More often than not, the neighbors of a state that experiences civil war or ethnic conflict end up accepting refugees within their own borders. Opening the borders to refugees does not qualify for providing safe havens to an armed group that is fighting its target government unless the group is engaging in violent cross-border attacks. The members of the Karen National Union, which has been fighting Myanmar's government for over five decades, frequently escape into neighboring Thailand. They occasionally organize armed attacks back into Myanmar. The following statement illustrates the type of evidence used to determine whether a state provides safe havens to a group:

> 'Thai television reported that Burma was preparing to attack Karen refugee camps inside Thailand. Mortars reportedly were fired at one camp across the border in the Teakaplaw region, forcing thousands of refugees to flee. The

fighting comes two weeks after a Karen splinter group supported by government launched cross-border raids against three camps of refugees loyal to the Karen National Union inside Thailand. Two camps were burned to the ground and 8,000 refugees fled into the Thai jungle.' ("Burmese army launches…" 1997)

The above statement indicates that the Karen National Union has safe havens in Thailand. Whether the support is provided intentionally by the state is discussed more generally in the beginning of this section when explaining active vs. passive support. In addition, multiple sources were used to determine whether the KNU members were engaging in cross-border attacks into Myanmar.

SafeLead: Providing sanctuary to leadership. Providing safe havens to leaders of a group is different than providing safe havens to its members. Group leaders end up living in other states due to reasons such as being expelled from their target countries or not feeling safe in the target countries anymore. Of the total years that rebels' leaders spent in external safe havens, 35% were in democratic states, in contrast to the 65% spent in autocratic states. Despite that, democratic states might be preferred by rebels' leaders due to the individual freedoms and liberties that make their arrest difficult. After the assassination of Indian president Rajiv Gandhi, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) lost its support base and funding from India. As a result, they founded offices in Western European countries, such as Switzerland, France, and UKG, as well as USA and Canada. There is clear evidence that the Sri Lankan government put pressure on these countries to stop the fund raising activities of the group and to return the group's leaders back to Sri Lanka. The United States banned the group and its fundraising activities in 1997 by passing an anti-terrorism law and declaring LTTE a terrorist organization. ("Tamil Tigers, from a rag-tag band…" 1997) The United Kingdom and Canada did not ban fundraising activities of the group until 2001. (Jayamaha 2000)

Open Offices: the group has a physical office which does not command the violent activities of the organization or headquarters to spread propaganda and raise funds, not necessarily directed towards violence. Usually, if a supporter country provides headquarters for a NAG or allows it to open offices within its territories, there is a high probability that the country provides safe haven to its leadership.

TrainCamp: Providing training camps. Providing rebels with training camps requires extra effort on the part of the supporters than providing safe havens. Training camps are expected to be equipped with military equipment to help the members of a group in organizing and implementing violent attacks against their targets. During the Syrian occupation of Lebanon from 1976 to 2005, various Palestinian groups were trained in Lebanese territories by the assistance of Syria. ("Qom meeting of fundamentalist groups…" 1996) For instance, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad members had trained in the camps in Lebanon. Although the headquarters of the group had been placed in Damascus since its foundation, the training camps are not in Syrian territories. In coding the support of PIJ by Syria, providing training camps is not coded among the support types but providing safe havens to leaders is coded among the types of support.

Training: In addition to training camps, some states provide training not necessarily within their own borders. This refers to temporary assignment of a state's security forces to train the militants.

WeaponLog: Providing weapons and logistics aid. This variable is coded if there is clear evidence that the arms originated from the supporting country. The evidence on whether

a state provides arms to rebels is not easily attainable. Mere allegations by the target states are not enough to prove that a state provides arms to a rebel group. In the following narration directly cited from the source, it is clear that Libya's giving arms to IRA was not a mere allegation by the United Kingdom:

> 'Histories of the IRA have identified Mr Murphy as an IRA weapons smuggler who helped to procure supplies by travelling to Libya using false passports. In the 1980s, Libya supplied the Provisional IRA with more than 100 tonnes of weaponry'. (Sharrock 2007)

FinAid: Fundraising is different than receiving money from the supporter state's government. While in some cases, such as Iran and Hezbollah, governments provide funds to a rebel group, in many others, the groups themselves manage to raise funds within the borders of another state, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) raising funds within the USA. When this is the case, the support is assumed to be *passive*, i.e. rebels select certain states as supporters without necessarily any intentional effort on the part of the supporter. It is possible to argue that the USA had the capacity to control the IRA's activities, in which case the support of the group would have been intentional. However, making this judgment requires a more extensive analysis of each case in the dataset, which is not an attainable goal within the time frame of a project (?). The specific type of support the IRA obtained from the US is also called 'passive support' by Byman (2005c). I coded it as *passive* support since the US government was not intentionally creating any channels to help the group.

Transport: Providing transport of the military equipment and military advice. If a state ends up being a transport point for a rebel group, it is coded separately from providing arms and military supplies. Cambodia has for years become a *de facto* transport point for arms smuggling for many non-state armed groups in Asia. (Bonner 1998) Zaire was the major transport point for the weapons sent by the USA to UNITA, which was fighting the communist regime in Angola. (Lewis 1987)

Troop: In some cases, states allow their troops to fight on the side of the rebels against their targets. When civil wars or ethnic conflict crossed the borders of other states, there is a risk that the latter acts to protect its borders. This variable is not coded for passive support since it is impossible for a state to send its troops to help a NAG and do this passively? This leads to the accusations for providing troop support to rebels. Myanmar accused the Thai army multiple times of providing the KNU with troops during the counter-border operations of Myanmar's government into the Karen National Union camps in Thailand. The following illustrates type of statements and narratives used to code troop support:

> 'Angola, allied to Sassou Nguesso's Cobra militia, staged a weekend attack along the border between its oil-producing Cabinda enclave and southwestern Congo, sending some 1,000 troops into Congo, according to diplomats.' ("Angolan tanks and troops enter…" 1997)

> "Following the 1979 establishment of the Islamic Republic and as a response to Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Iran organized, equipped, and trained Hezbollah. Tehran deployed 1,500 personnel from its IslamicRevolutionaryGuardCorp (IRGC)—a semi-autonomous vanguard of Iran's military used to foment regional disorder and support terrorist organizations—to Lebanon." (Wilner 2012, 19-20)

Only six percent of the binary support years involve states that provide troops to rebels. This is normal if we consider that troop support is a very risky strategy, since it means directly engaging with the target of a rebel group. The purpose of supporting a group is to avoid direct confrontation with the adversary, besides trying to undermine the power of an adversary.

Other: any other kind of support not listed above.

DomSup: Whether there is a support basis from within the target country.

DomSup_P: The confidence by which we can claim domestic support from a NAG's target or supporter. The domestic support refers to support from among the people rather than the political leadership. 1 – not much confident, 2- somehow confident, 3- confident.

SupTerm: Why did the support end?

> 1. Pressures from the target of a given NAG
> 2. Pressures from the international community in general: other states (other than the target)
> 3. Regime change in the target country
> 4. Regime change in the supporting country
> 5. Leadership change in supporting country
> 6. Group ceased activity
> 7. Group signed a ceasefire
> 8. Group turned into a political movement
> 9. Other: describe

Support termination is coded as missing when there is no external state support for a NAG in a given year.

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Table 2. NAGs Coded, 1945-2010

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Afghanistan	1978	131	137	*People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)*
Afghanistan	1979-1989	132	137	Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Afghanistan	1980-1988	133	137	Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Afghanistan	1980-1989	134	137	Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan-Khalis faction
Afghanistan	1980-1988	135	137	Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Afghanistan	1980-1989	136	137	Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Afghanistan	1981-1988	137	137	Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan
Afghanistan	1984	138	137	Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Afghanistan	1980-1991	139	137	Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Afghanistan	1989-1990	140	137	Hizb-i Wahdat
Afghanistan	1990	141	137	*Military faction (forces of Shahnawaz Tanay)*
Afghanistan	1993-1995	142	137	Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami
Afghanistan	1995-2012	143	137	Taleban
Afghanistan	1996-2001	144	137	United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA)
Algeria	1985-1991	348	191	Takfir wa'l Hijra
Algeria	1985-1997	349	191	Islamic Salvation Army (AIS)
Algeria	1993-2003	350	191	Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA)
Algeria	1999-2012	351	191	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Angola	1991-2006	352	192	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda - Renovada (FLEC-R)

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Angola	1994-2014*	353	192	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda - Armed Forces of Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)
Angola	1961-1974	378	131	National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)
Angola	1975-2002	379	131	*National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)*
Argentina	1955	400	50	Military faction (forces of Eduardo A. Lonardi Doucet)
Argentina	1963	401	50	Military faction (Colorados)
Argentina	1974-1979	402	50	*People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)*
Argentina	1975-1977	403	50	*Montoneros / Movimiento Peronista Montonero (MPM)*
Argentina	1955-1980	458	50	Military faction (forces of Samuel Toranzo Calderón)
Azerbaijan	1994-2005	178	193	Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh
Azerbaijan	1993	187	201	Military faction (forces of Suret Husseinov)
Azerbaijan	1995	188	201	Special Purpose Police Unit (OPON forces)
Bangladesh	1975-1991	126	126	Jana Samhati Samiti/Shanti Bahini (JSS/SB)
Bangladesh	2005-2014*	434	275	*Purba Banglar Communist Party (PBCP)*
Bangladesh	2005-2014*	479	275	*Purba Banglar Communist Party - Janajuddha (PBCP - Janajudhha)*
Bolivia	1946	383	1	*Popular Revolutionary Movement*
Bolivia	1952	384	1	*Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR)*
Bolivia	1967	385	1	*National Liberation Army (ELN)*

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992-1995	179	194	Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1993-1995	189	202	Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1993-1994	190	203	Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Burkina Faso	1987	329	165	*Popular Front*
Burundi	1965	241	90	Military faction (forces loyal to Gervais Nyangoma)
Burundi	1991-2000	242	90	Palipehutu
Burundi	1997-2008	244	90	Palipehutu-National Forces of Liberation (Palipehutu-FNL)
Burundi	1997-2000	245	90	National Liberation Front (Frolina)
Burundi	1998-2003	246	90	National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD)
Cambodia (Kampuchea)	1967-1989	111	103	*Khmer Rouge (KR)*
Cambodia (Kampuchea)	1978-1979	112	103	Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS)
Cambodia (Kampuchea)	1979-1991	113	103	Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF)
Cambodia (Kampuchea)	1982-1997	114	103	National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC)
Cameroon	1984	327	158	Military faction (forces of Ibrahim Saleh)
Cameroon	1960-1961	376	158	*Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC)*
Central African Republic	2001	364	222	Military faction (forces of André Kolingba)
Central African Republic	2002	365	222	Forces of Francois Bozize
Central African Republic	2006	366	222	Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR)

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Central African Republic	2009-2011	445	222	Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP)
Chad	1966-1970	247	91	Chad National Liberation Front (Frolinat)
Chad	1971-1972	248	91	First Liberation Army
Chad	1971	249	91	Second Liberation Army
Chad	1976-1981	250	91	Armed Forces of the North (FAN)
Chad	1977-1979	251	91	People's Armed Forces (FAP)
Chad	1982	252	91	Chadian Armed Forces (FAT)
Chad	1983-1986	253	91	Transitional Government of National Union (GUNT)
Chad	1989-1990	254	91	Islamic Legion
Chad	1989	255	91	Revolutionary Forces of 1 April
Chad	1989	256	91	Movement for National Salvation of Chad (MOSANAT)
Chad	1990	257	91	Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS)
Chad	1991-1999	258	91	Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD)
Chad	1992-1994	259	91	National Council of Chadian Recovery (CNR)
Chad	1992-1994	260	91	National Salvation Committee for Peace and Democracy (CSNDP)
Chad	1991	261	91	Military faction (forces of Maldoum Bada Abbas)
Chad	1992-1994	262	91	Chadian National Front (FNT)
Chad	1997-1998	263	91	Armed Forces for a Federal Republic (FARF)
Chad	1999-2005	264	91	Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT)

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Chad	2005-2006	265	91	United Front for Democratic Change (FUCD)
Chad	2006	266	91	Rally of Democratic Forces (RAFD)
Chad	1987	267	91	Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR)
Chad	2006-2007	268	91	Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD)
Chad	2008	380	91	National Alliance (AN)
Chad	2009	453	91	Union of Resistance Forces (UFR)
Chad	2010	457	91	Popular Front for National Resistance (PFNR)
Chile	1973	421	125	Military faction (forces of Augusto Pinochet, Toribio Merino and Leigh Guzman)
China	1946-1949	2	3	*People's Liberation Army (PLA)*
China	1947	18	18	Taiwanese insurgents
China	1950-1959	54	39	Tibet
China	1990-2014*	470	273	East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)
Colombia	1964-2014*	407	92	*Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)*
Colombia	1966-2008	408	92	*The National Liberation Army (ELN)*
Colombia	1978-1988	409	92	*19th of April Movement (M-19)*
Colombia	1968-2014*	410	92	*The Popular Liberation Army (EPL)*
Comoros	1989-1989	330	167	Presidential guard
Comoros	1997-2000	356	213	MPA/Republic of Anjouan
Congo	1997	357	214	*Cobras*
Congo	1993-1999	358	214	Ninjas
Congo	1997-1999	359	214	Cocoyes

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Congo	1998-2002	360	214	Ntsiloulous
Costa Rica	1948	389	27	National Liberation Army (NLA)
Croatia	1992-1995	180	195	Serbian Republic of Krajina
Croatia	1992-1995	488	195	Serbian irregulars
Cuba	1953-1958	398	45	*26th of July Movement (M-26-7)*
Cuba	1961	399	45	Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC)
Djibouti	1991-1994	342	184	Front for Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD)
Djibouti	1999	343	184	Front for Restoration of Unity and Democracy - Ahmed Dini (FRUD-AD)
Dominican Republic	1965	411	93	*Military faction (Constitutionalists)*
DR Congo (Zaire)	1960-1962	219	68	State of Katanga
DR Congo (Zaire)	1960-1962	220	69	Independent Mining State of South Kasai
DR Congo (Zaire)	1964-1965	232	86	National Liberation Council (CNL)
DR Congo (Zaire)	1967	233	86	Opposition militias
DR Congo (Zaire)	1977-1978	234	86	Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FNLC)
DR Congo (Zaire)	1996-1997	235	86	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL)
DR Congo (Zaire)	1998-2002	236	86	Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)
DR Congo (Zaire)	1998-2002	237	86	Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)
DR Congo (Zaire)	2006-2009	238	86	National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP)
DR Congo (Zaire)	2007-2008	373	254	Kingdom of Kongo (BDK)
Egypt	1993-1998	181	196	al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
El Salvador	1972	416	120	Military faction (forces of Benjamin Mejia)
El Salvador	1979	417	120	*Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP)*
El Salvador	1979	418	120	*Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)*
El Salvador	1980-1991	419	120	*Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)*
Eritrea	1997-2003	307	130	Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement - Abu Suhai (lEIJM - AS)
Ethiopia	1960	221	70	Military faction (forces of Mengistu Neway)
Ethiopia	1976-1987	222	70	*Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP)*
Ethiopia	1976-1988	223	70	*Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF)*
Ethiopia	1977-1978	224	70	Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU)
Ethiopia	1983-1985	225	70	Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM)
Ethiopia	1989	226	70	Military faction (forces of Amha Desta and Merid Negusie)
Ethiopia	1989-1991	227	70	The Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
Ethiopia	1964-1980	228	78	Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)
Ethiopia	1973-1991	229	78	*Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)*
Ethiopia	1976-1983	308	133	Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF)
Ethiopia	1994-2009	309	133	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)
Ethiopia	1975-1976	331	168	Afar Liberation Front (ALF)
Ethiopia	1996	332	168	Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union Front (ARDUF)

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Ethiopia	1993-1999	354	133	Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI)
Ethiopia	1977-2014*	363	219	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)
Ethiopia	1977-1980	446	261	Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF)
Ethiopia	1983	447	262	Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM)
Ethiopia	1964	448	133	Ogaden Liberation Front
Ethiopia	1991-1994	459	268	Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF)
France	1946-1953	1	2	Khmer Issarak
France	1946-1953	8	9	Lao Issara
France	1946-1954	17	17	*League for the Independence of Vietnam (Viet minh)*
France	1947	20	21	Democratic Movement for Malagasy Rejuvenation (MDRM)
France	1961-1962	100	73	Organisation of the Secret Army (OAS)
France	1953-1956	214	47	Istiqlal
France	1953-1956	215	48	National Liberation Army (NLA)
France	1954-1962	216	49	National Liberation Front (FLN)
France	1955-1957	217	49	Algerian National Movement (MNA)
France	1957-1960	377	59	National Liberation Army (NLA)
France	1957-1959	492	57	*Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC)*
Gabon	1964	239	87	Military faction (forces loyal to Léon M'Ba)
Gambia	1981	324	149	*National Revolutionary Council (NRC)*
Georgia	1991-1992	172	185	National Guard and Mkhedrioni
Georgia	1992-1993	173	185	Zviadists

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Georgia	1992-1993	182	197	Republic of Abkhazia
Georgia	1992-2008	183	198	Republic of South Ossetia
Ghana	1966	269	98	National Liberation Council (NLC)
Ghana	1981	270	98	Military faction (forces of Jerry John Rawlings)
Ghana	1983	271	98	*Military faction (forces of Ekow Dennis and Edward Adjei-Ampofo)*
Greece	1946-1949	3	4	*Democratic Army of Greece (DSE)*
Guatemala	1949-1949	390	36	Military faction
Guatemala	1954	391	36	Forces of Carlos Castillo Armas
Guatemala	1963-1981	392	36	*Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR I)*
Guatemala	1970-1981	393	36	*Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR II)*
Guatemala	1975-1981	394	36	*Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)*
Guatemala	1979-1981	395	36	*Revolutionary Organization of Armed People (ORPA)*
Guatemala	1982-1995	396	36	*Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)*
Guinea	2000-2001	275	111	Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea (RFDG)
Guinea-Bissau	1998-1999	361	216	Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice
Haiti	1989	427	186	Military faction (forces of Himmler Rebu and Guy Francois)
Haiti	1991-1993	428	186	Military faction (forces of Raol Cédras)
Haiti	2004	429	186	National Revolutionary Front for the Liberation (FLRN)
Haiti	2004	430	186	OP Lavalas (Chimères)
India	1969-1971	33	29	*Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML)*

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
India	1990-2004	34	29	*People's War Group (PWG)*
India	1992-2004	35	29	*Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCC)*
India	2005-2011	36	29	*Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M)*
India	1956-1968	63	54	Naga National Council (NNC)
India	1992-2000	64	54	*National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak-Muivah (NSCN - IM)*
India	2005-2014*	65	54	*National Socialist Council of Nagaland -Khaplang (NSCN - K)*
India	1966-1968	108	99	Mizo National Front (MNF)
India	1979-1988	145	139	Tripura National Volunteers (TNV)
India	1992-1999	146	139	All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)
India	1995-2014*	147	139	*The National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)*
India	1982-2014*	154	152	*People's Liberation Army (PLA)*
India	1994-2009	155	152	*United National Liberation Front (UNLF)*
India	1997-2014*	156	263	Kuki National Front (KNF)
India	2008-2009	157	152	*Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)*
India	2008-2009	158	152	*People's Liberation Army of Manipur (PREPAK)*
India	1983-1993	159	156	Sikh insurgents
India	1984-2012	165	169	Kashmir Insurgents
India	1990-2010	166	170	*United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)*
India	1989-1993	202	227	*All Bodo Students' Union (ABSU)*
India	1993-2010	203	227	*The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)*
India	2008	208	258	The Dima Halam Daoga - Black Widow (DHD - BW)

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
India	2000-2008	209	259	People's United Liberation Front (PULF)
India	2009-2014*	450	227	*National Democratic Front of Bodoland - Ranjan Daimary (NDFB - RD)*
India	2010-2012	477	272	Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA)
Indonesia	1950	55	40	Republic of South Moluccas
Indonesia	1953-1961	58	46	Darul Islam
Indonesia	1958-1961	59	46	Permesta movement
Indonesia	1958-1961	60	46	Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI)
Indonesia	1965-1981	107	94	Free Papua Movement (OPM)
Indonesia	1975-1998	130	134	*Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin)*
Indonesia	1990-2005	167	171	Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
Iran	1946-1996	5	6	*Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI)*
Iran	1979-2001	148	143	*People's Mojahedin of Iran (MEK)*
Iran	2004-2014*	149	143	*Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK)*
Iran	2006-2010	150	143	People's Resistance Movement of Iran (Jondullah)
Iran	1979-1980	151	144	Arab Political and Cultural Organisation (APCO)
Iraq	1958	68	62	Military Faction (Free Officers Movement)
Iraq	1959	69	62	Military faction (forces of Abdul Wahab al-Shawaf)
Iraq	1963	70	62	Military faction (forces of Abd as-Salam Arif)

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Iraq	1963	71	62	National Council for the Revolutionary Command (NCRC)
Iraq	1982-1996	72	62	Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
Iraq	2004-2008	73	62	Al-Mahdi Army
Iraq	2004-2014	74	62	Ansar al-Islam
Iraq	2004-2014*	75	62	Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)
Iraq	1961-1991	101	74	Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
Iraq	1976-1996	102	74	*Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)*
Iraq	1977-1978	103	74	Kurdistan Democratic Party-Provisional Command (KDP-QM)
Israel	1965-1988	45	37	*Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)*
Israel	1989-2001	46	37	*Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)*
Israel	1989	47	37	*Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC)*
Israel	1990-2007	48	37	*Fatah*
Israel	1995-2014*	49	37	Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Israel	1993-2014*	50	37	Hamas
Israel	2002-2004	52	37	al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (AMB)
Israel	1990-2014*	206	251	Hezbollah
Ivory Coast	2003	367	225	Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP)
Ivory Coast	2002	368	225	Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI)

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Ivory Coast	2002-2003	369	225	Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West (MPIGO)
Kenya	1982	326	153	Military faction (forces of Hezekiah Ochuka)
Laos	1959-1973	85	65	*Pathet Lao*
Laos	1960	86	65	Neutralists
Laos	1989-1990	87	65	Lao Resistance Movement (LRM)
Lebanon	1958	77	63	*Independent Nasserite Movement /Mourabitoun militia*
Lebanon	1975-1984	78	63	*Lebanese National Movement (LNM)*
Lebanon	1976	79	63	Lebanese Arab Army (LAA)
Lebanon	1983-1984	80	63	Amal
Lebanon	1986	82	63	Lebanese Forces - Hobeika faction
Lebanon	1989-1990	83	63	Lebanese Army (Aoun)
Lebanon	1989	84	63	Lebanese Forces
Lesotho	1998	362	217	Military faction
Liberia	1980	318	146	Military faction (forces of Samuel Doe)
Liberia	1989-1997	319	146	National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
Liberia	1990-1992	320	146	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL)
Liberia	2000-2003	321	146	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)
Liberia	2003-2003	322	146	Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)
Macedonia, FYR	2001-2001	201	223	National Liberation Army (UCK)
Madagascar (Malagasy)	1971	285	114	*National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar (Monima)*
Malaysia	1948-1989	37	64	*Communist Party of Malaya (CPM)*
Malaysia	1963-1966	105	83	*Communist Clandestine Organisation (CCO)*

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Mali	1990	333	177	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPA)
Mali	1994	334	177	Arab Islamic Front of Azawad (FIAA)
Mali	2007-2009	335	177	Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change (ATNMC)
Mauritania	1975-1978	375	253	Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO)
Mauritania	2008-2012	482	267	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Mexico	1994-1996	431	205	*Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN)*
Mexico	1996	432	205	*Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR)*
Moldova	1992-1997	184	199	Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR)
Morocco	1971	286	115	Military faction (forces of Mohamed Madbouh)
Morocco	1975-1989	487	135	Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO)
Mozambique	1977-1992	310	136	Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo)
Myanmar (Burma)	2000	22	23	God's army
Myanmar (Burma)	1948-1988	23	24	*Communist Party of Burma (CPB)*
Myanmar (Burma)	1948-1970	24	24	*Communit Party of Burma-Red Flag (CPB-RF)*
Myanmar (Burma)	1948-1953	25	24	*People's Volunteer Organization - White Band (PVO - "White Band" faction)*
Myanmar (Burma)	1990-2014*	26	24	All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF)
Myanmar (Burma)	1991-1992	27	25	Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF)

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Myanmar (Burma)	1991-2014*	28	25	Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO)
Myanmar (Burma)	1949-1951	29	26	*Mon Freedom League-Mon United Front (MFL-MUF)*
Myanmar (Burma)	1952-1958	30	26	*Mon People's Front (MPF)*
Myanmar (Burma)	1959-2014*	31	26	New Mon State Party (NMSP)
Myanmar (Burma)	1996	32	26	Beik Mon Army (BMA)
Myanmar (Burma)	1949-1950	41	34	*Pawngyawng National Defense Force (PNDF)*
Myanmar (Burma)	1961-1992	42	34	Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)
Myanmar (Burma)	1957-2014*	66	56	*Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)*
Myanmar (Burma)	1959	88	67	Noom Suk Har (NSH)
Myanmar (Burma)	1960-1961	89	67	Shan State Independence Army (SSIA)
Myanmar (Burma)	1962-1963	90	67	Shan National United Front (SNUF)
Myanmar (Burma)	1964-1973	91	67	Shan State Army (SSA)
Myanmar (Burma)	1969-1970	92	67	*Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organization (SSNLO)*
Myanmar (Burma)	1969-1983	93	67	Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA)
Myanmar (Burma)	1976	94	67	Shan State Revolutionary Army (SSRA)
Myanmar (Burma)	1984	95	67	Tai Revolutionary Council (TRC)
Myanmar (Burma)	1985-1995	96	67	Möng Tai Army (MTA)
Myanmar (Burma)	1996-2014*	97	67	Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS)

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Myanmar (Burma)	1949-1975	438	23	*Karen National United Party (KNUP)*
Myanmar (Burma)	1977	440	25	The Arakan Liberation Party (ALP)
Myanmar (Burma)	1964-1972	441	25	Arakan National Liberation Party (ANLP)
Myanmar (Burma)	1948-1957	442	25	Arakan People's Liberation Party (APLP)
Myanmar (Burma)	1964-1973	444	25	*Communist Party of Arakan (CPA)*
Myanmar (Burma)	1948-1961	449	25	Mujahid Party
Myanmar (Burma)	1973-1978	452	25	Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF)
Myanmar (Burma)	2010-2014*	455	23	Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA 5)
Myanmar (Burma)	1966-2014*	21	23	Karen National Union (KNU)
Myanmar (Burma)	1997	204	228	*United Wa State Army (UWSA)*
Myanmar (Burma)	2009-2014*	435	264	Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)
Myanmar (Burma)	1973-1981	437	265	*Lahu National United Party (LNUP)*
Nepal	1960-1962	98	72	*Nepali Congress*
Nepal	1996-2006	99	72	*Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M)*
Netherlands	1946-1949	4	5	Indonesian People's Army
Nicaragua	1977-1979	422	140	*Sandinistan National Liberation Front (FSLN)*
Nicaragua	1982-1990	423	140	Contras / Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN)
Niger	1991-1993	336	255	Air and Azawak Liberation Front (FLAA)
Niger	1994-1995	337	178	Coordinated Armed resistance (CRA)
Niger	1997	338	255	Union of Armed Resistance Forces (UFRA)

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Niger	1995	355	212	Democratic Front for Renewal (FDR)
Niger	2007-2008	374	255	Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ)
Nigeria	1966	272	100	Military faction (forces of Patrick Nzeogwu)
Nigeria	1967-1970	274	107	Republic of Biafra
Nigeria	2004	371	249	Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa
Nigeria	2004	372	250	Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF)
Nigeria	2009-2014*	443	100	Boko Haram
North Yemen	1948	38	33	Opposition coalition
North Yemen	1962-1970	39	33	Royalists
North Yemen	1979-1982	40	33	*National Democratic Front (NDF)*
Oman	1957	67	61	State of Oman/Free Oman
Oman	1969-1975	125	121	*Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO)*
Pakistan	1971	121	116	Mukti Bahini
Pakistan	2004-2009	127	129	Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)
Pakistan	2005-2006	128	129	Baluch Ittehad
Pakistan	2008-2009	129	129	Baloch Republican Army (BRA)
Pakistan	1990-1996	194	209	Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)
Pakistan	2007	195	209	Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)
Pakistan	2008-2014*	196	209	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Pakistan	2009-2014*	212	209	Lashkar-e-Islam
Pakistan	1974-2012	480	129	Baluch Liberation Front (BLF)
Panama	1989	425	172	Military faction (forces of Moisés Giroldi)

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Papua New Guinea	1989-1996	168	174	The Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)
Paraguay	1947	386	22	Opposition coalition (Febreristas, Liberals and Communists)
Paraguay	1954	387	22	Military faction (forces of Alfredo Stroessner)
Paraguay	1989	388	22	Military faction (forces of Andres Rodriguez)
Peru	1965	412	95	*National Liberation Army (ELN)*
Peru	1965	413	95	*Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR)*
Peru	1963-2007	414	95	*Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso)*
Peru	1989-1993	415	95	*Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)*
Philippines	1946-1954	9	10	*Nation's Army Against the Japanese (Huk)*
Philippines	1969-2012	10	10	*Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)*
Philippines	1987-1995	11	10	Military Faction (forces of Honasan, Abenina & Zumel)
Philippines	1970-1971	115	112	Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM)
Philippines	1972-2007	116	112	Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
Philippines	1990-2014	117	112	Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
Philippines	1993-2014*	118	112	Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Philippines	2001-2002	119	112	Mindanao Independence Movement - Nur Misuari (MNLF - NM)
Philippines	2007	120	112	Mindanao Independence Movement - Habier Malik (MNLF - HM)

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Portugal	1961-1974	218	66	*People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)*
Portugal	1963-1973	230	82	African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC)
Portugal	1964-1974	240	88	*Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo)*
Portugal	1961-1975	484	66	National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)
Portugal	1966-1975	491	66	*National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)*
Rumania	1989	169	175	National Salvation Front (NSF)
Russia (Soviet Union)	1946-1948	12	11	Forest Brothers
Russia (Soviet Union)	1946	13	12	Latvian National Guerrilla Organisation (LNPA)
Russia (Soviet Union)	1946	14	12	Association of the Latvian Fatherland Guards (LTS(p)A)
Russia (Soviet Union)	1946-1948	15	13	United Democratic Resistance Movement (BDPS)
Russia (Soviet Union)	1946-1950	16	14	Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)
Russia (Soviet Union)	1990	171	182	Azerbaijani Popular Front Party (APF)
Russia (Soviet Union)	1993	191	204	Parliamentary forces
Russia (Soviet Union)	1994-2007	192	206	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria
Russia (Soviet Union)	1999	198	220	Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk district
Russia (Soviet Union)	2007-2009	207	257	Forces of the Caucasus Emirate
Rwanda	1990-1994	339	179	Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR)

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Rwanda	1990-2012	340	179	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Rwanda	1996-2000	466	179	Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR)
Saudi Arabia	1979	152	145	al-Jama'a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba (JSM)
Senegal	1990-2003	341	180	Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC)
Serbia (Yugoslavia)	1998-1999	197	218	Kosova Liberation Army (UCK)
Sierra Leone	1991-2001	344	187	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
Sierra Leone	1997-2000	345	187	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)
Sierra Leone	2000	347	187	West Side Boys (WSB)
Somalia	1982-1984	311	141	Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)
Somalia	1983-1991	312	141	Somali National Movement (SNM)
Somalia	1989-1991	313	141	Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
Somalia	1990-1991	314	141	United Somali Congress / Somali Salvation Alliance (USC/SSA)
Somalia	1991-1996	315	141	United Somali Congress / Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA)
Somalia	2001-2004	316	141	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC)
Somalia	2006-2008	317	141	Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS/UIC)
Somalia	2008-2014*	381	141	Al-Shabaab
Somalia	2008-2008	382	141	Harakat Ras Kamboni
Somalia	2009-2014*	439	141	Hizbul-Islam

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
South Africa	1966-1988	273	101	*South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)*
South Africa	1981-1988	325	150	African National Congress (ANC)
South Vietnam	1955-1964	62	52	*Viet Kong (FNL)*
South Yemen	1986	164	164	*Yemenite Socialist Party - Abdul Fattah Ismail faction*
Spain	1978-2011	153	147	*ETA*
Spain	1957-1975	486	60	National Liberation Army (NLA)
Sri Lanka	1971-1990	122	117	*People's Liberation Front (JVP)*
Sri Lanka	1984-2009	160	157	*Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)*
Sri Lanka	1984-1985	161	157	Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO)
Sri Lanka	1985	162	157	Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)
Sudan	1963-1972	231	85	Anya Nya
Sudan	1971	276	113	*Sudanese Communist Party*
Sudan	1976	277	113	Islamic Charter Front
Sudan	1983-2014	278	113	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)
Sudan	1996-2005	279	113	National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
Sudan	2003-2011	280	113	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
Sudan	2003-2009	281	113	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)
Sudan	2006	282	113	National Redemption Front (NRF)
Sudan	2006	283	113	Sudan Liberation Movement/Arm - Minni Minnawi (SLM/A - MM)

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Sudan	2007-2008	284	113	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army - Unity (SLM/A-Unity)
Sudan	2010-2011	489	113	South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A)
Suriname	1987	424	162	Surinamese Liberation Army (SLA)
Syria	1966	109	102	Military faction (forces loyal to Nureddin Atassi and Youssef Zeayen)
Syria	1979-1982	110	102	Muslim Brotherhood
Tajikistan	1992-1999	185	200	United Tajik Opposition (UTO)
Tajikistan	1998	186	200	Forces of Khudoberdiyev
Tajikistan	2010-2011	199	200	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Thailand	1951	56	43	Military faction (Navy)
Thailand	1974-1982	57	43	*Communist Party of Thailand (CPT)*
Thailand	2003-2014*	205	248	Patani insurgents
Togo	1986	328	163	Togolese Movement for Democracy (MTD)
Trinidad and Tobago	1990	426	183	Jamaat al-Muslimeen
Tunisia	1980	323	148	Résistance Armée Tunisienne
Turkey	1984-2014*	163	159	*Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)*
Turkey	1991-1992	174	188	*Devrimci Sol*
Turkey	2005	175	188	*Maoist Communist Party (MKP)*
Uganda	1971	287	118	Military faction (forces of Idi Amin)
Uganda	1972-1979	288	118	Kikosi Maalum

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
Uganda	1974	289	118	Military faction (forces of Charles Arube)
Uganda	1979	290	118	Front for National Salvation (Fronasa)
Uganda	1979	291	118	Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF)
Uganda	1980-1981	292	118	Former Uganda National Army (FUNA)
Uganda	1981-1986	293	118	National Resistance Army (NRA)
Uganda	1981-1983	294	118	Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF)
Uganda	1986-1987	295	118	Holy Spirit Movement (HSM)
Uganda	1986-1988	296	118	Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA)
Uganda	1982	297	118	Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM)
Uganda	1987-1992	298	118	Uganda People's Army (UPA)
Uganda	1988	300	118	Lord's Army
Uganda	1996-2007	301	118	Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
Uganda	1996	302	118	West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)
Uganda	1997-2002	303	118	Uganda National Rescue Front - II (UNRF II)
United Kingdom	1946	7	8	National Military Organization in the Land of Israel (IZL [Etzel])
United Kingdom	1955-1959	61	51	National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA)
United Kingdom	1962	104	76	North Kalimantan Liberation Army
United Kingdom	1964-1967	106	89	Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY)
United Kingdom	1971-2005	123	119	Provisional IRA (PIRA)
United Kingdom	1998	124	119	Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)

Target	Year	NAG Code[1]	ACD Code[2]	Group Name[3]
United Kingdom	1952-1956	213	44	Mau Mau
United Kingdom	1948-1957	483	31	*Communist Party of Malaya (CPM)*
United States of America	1950	397	41	Puerto Rican Nationalist Party
United States of America	2001-2014*	433	224	al-Qaida
United States of America	1963-1973	493	.	*Pathet Lao*
Uruguay	1972	420	123	*Tupamaros National Liberation Movement (MLN/Tupamaros)*
Uzbekistan	2004	200	221	Jihad Islamic Group (JIG)
Uzbekistan	1999-2000	485	221	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Venezuela	1962	404	80	*Military faction (navy)*
Venezuela	1982	405	80	*Bandera Roja*
Venezuela	1992	406	80	*Military faction (forces of Hugo Chávez)*
Yemen	1994	193	207	*Democratic Republic of Yemen*
Yemen	2009-2014*	436	33	Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)	1967-1974	304	122	Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)	1973-1976	305	122	*Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)*
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)	1976-1979	306	122	*Patriotic Front (PF)*

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[1] This is the unique code assigned by the state-NAG Cooperation Dataset.

[2] This number is the same as UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data Conflict Identity number to make the data compatible with other UCDP/PRIO Datasets and easily adoptable by other researchers.

[3] When in italics, the NAG is determined to adopt leftist/socialist ideology at some point during its lifetime.